

## The Anglican Church

Investigation Report October 2020



## **Executive Summary**

This investigation concerns the extent to which the Church of England and the Church in Wales protected children from sexual abuse in the past. It also examines the effectiveness of current safeguarding arrangements. A public hearing on these specific areas was held in 2019. This report also draws on the previous two case studies on the Anglican Church, which related to the Diocese of Chichester and Peter Ball.

In addition to recommendations made in the case studies, we make eight recommendations in this report, covering areas such as clergy discipline, information-sharing and support for victims and survivors. We will return to other matters raised in this investigation, such as mandatory reporting, in the Inquiry's final report.

#### The Church of England

The Church of England is the largest Christian denomination in the country, with over a million regular worshippers. Convictions of sexual abuse of children by people who were clergy or in positions of trust associated with the Church date back to the 1940s. The total number of convicted offenders associated with the Church from the 1940s until 2018 is 390. In 2018, 449 concerns were reported to the Church about recent child sexual abuse, of which more than half related to church officers. Latterly, a significant amount of offending involved the downloading or possession of indecent images of children. The Inquiry examined a number of cases relating to both convicted perpetrators and alleged perpetrators, many of which demonstrated the Church's failure to take seriously disclosures by or about children or to refer allegations to the statutory authorities. These included:

- Timothy Storey, who was a youth leader in the Diocese of London from 2002 to 2007. He used his role to groom teenage girls. Storey is currently serving 15 years in prison for several offences against children, including rape. He had admitted sexual activity with a teenager to diocesan staff years before his conviction, but denied coercion.
- Victor Whitsey, who was Bishop of Chester between 1974 and 1982. Thirteen people complained to Cheshire Constabulary about sexual abuse by Whitsey and the Church of England is aware of six more complainants. The allegations included sexual assault of teenage boys and girls while providing them with pastoral support. He died in 1987.
- Reverend Trevor Devamanikkam, who was a priest until 1996. In 1984 and 1985 he allegedly raped and indecently assaulted a teenage boy, Matthew Ineson, on several occasions when the boy was living in his house. From 2012 onwards, Reverend Matthew Ineson made a number of disclosures to the Church and has complained about the Church's response. Devamanikkam was charged in 2017 and took his life the day before his court appearance.

Between 2003 and 2018, the main insurer of the Church of England (the Ecclesiastical Insurance Office) managed 217 claims relating to child sexual abuse in the Church.

The culture of the Church of England facilitated it becoming a place where abusers could hide. Deference to the authority of the Church and to individual priests, taboos surrounding discussion of sexuality and an environment where alleged perpetrators were treated more supportively than victims presented barriers to disclosure that many victims could not overcome. Another aspect of the Church's culture was clericalism, which meant that the moral authority of clergy was widely perceived as beyond reproach. As we have said in other reports, faith organisations such as the Anglican Church are marked out by their explicit moral purpose, in teaching right from wrong. In the context of child sexual abuse, the Church's neglect of the physical, emotional and spiritual well-being of children and young people in favour of protecting its reputation was in conflict with its mission of love and care for the innocent and the vulnerable.

Culture change is assisted by senior Church leaders now saying the right things, but lasting change will require more than platitudes. It will need continuous reinforcement of the abhorrent nature of child sexual abuse and the importance of safeguarding in all of the Church's settings.

We examined how well current safeguarding practice within the Church was responding to the issue of child sexual abuse. Until recently, at least 2015, the Church of England did not properly resource safeguarding. Funding has increased considerably, in particular for safeguarding staff. A further recent change means that the advice of safeguarding staff should not be ignored by senior clergy if they do not like the advice they are given. Nevertheless, examples of this continuing to occur were found in the file sampling undertaken on behalf of the Inquiry. Diocesan bishops hold ultimate responsibility for safeguarding within a diocese, and diocesan safeguarding advisers (DSAs) still do not provide a "*sufficient counterweight to episcopal authority*" according to Mr Colin Perkins (DSA for the Diocese of Chichester).<sup>1</sup>

We concluded that diocesan safeguarding officers – not clergy – are best placed to decide which cases to refer to the statutory authorities, and what action should be taken by the Church to keep children safe. Diocesan bishops have an important role to play, but they should not hold operational responsibility for safeguarding.

In respect of cathedrals, the Church has proposed a number of changes which should integrate safeguarding in cathedrals into the mainstream of the Church's safeguarding structures, though there remains much to do to ensure better protection of children in cathedrals and their linked choir schools.

The Church has failed to respond consistently to victims and survivors of child sexual abuse with sympathy and compassion, accompanied by practical and appropriate support. This has often added to the trauma already suffered by those who were abused by individuals associated with the Church. This failure was described as "*profoundly and deeply shocking*" by Archbishop Justin Welby.<sup>2</sup>

Excessive attention was often paid to the circumstances of the alleged perpetrator in comparison to the attention given to those who disclosed they had been sexually abused or to the issue of the risk that alleged perpetrators posed to others. For example, Robert Waddington (the Dean of Manchester Cathedral from 1984 to 1993) was the subject of a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ANG000645\_002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ACE027710

number of allegations of child sexual abuse over many years. Nevertheless, his permission to officiate was allowed to continue on the grounds of his age and frailty, without seemingly any consideration of the risks to children with whom he came into contact. He died in 2007.

Sometimes sexual offending was minimised. Reverend Ian Hughes was convicted in 2014 of downloading 8,000 indecent images of children. Bishop Peter Forster suggested to us that Hughes had been "*misled into viewing child pornography*" on the basis that "*pornography is so ubiquitously available and viewed*".<sup>3</sup> More than 800 of the images downloaded by Hughes were graded at the most serious level of abuse.

On some occasions public support was given to offending clergy. Perhaps the most stark example was that of the former bishop, Peter Ball. In that instance, Lord George Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, simply could not believe the allegations against Ball or acknowledge the seriousness of them regardless of evidence, and was outspoken in his support of his bishop. He seemingly wanted the whole business to go away.

Although there have been a number of important improvements in child protection practice within the Church, it has some way to go to rebuild the trust of victims. When the Church did try to uncover past failures, such as the Past Cases Review, which was completed in 2009, the exercise was flawed and incomplete. There were difficulties locating files and an inaccurate impression was given of the scale of the problem, which was likely to have been compounded by the inconsistencies of diocesan returns. The exercise must be repeated to obtain a more accurate picture.

The Clergy Discipline Measure (CDM) sets out the procedure for managing most disciplinary complaints made about the clergy. It is not confined to safeguarding issues. A member of the clergy may face disciplinary action on a broad range of allegations, but it is not designed to deal with risk management and the general capability of clergy. Since 2015, the clergy have a duty to pay due regard to safeguarding policies, and failure to do so is a disciplinary offence.

A number of penalties are available in the CDM, including the imposition of a penalty by consent without a hearing taking place. It is unclear whether this is a suitable disposal that is used sparingly and only in appropriate cases. Under the CDM, members of the clergy cannot be deposed from holy orders – that is to have their status as clergy revoked – in relation to safeguarding matters even if an individual has been convicted. Although such an option would make little practical difference if someone was otherwise removed from office, there is a symbolic difference from the perspective of a victim or survivor.

Archbishop Welby criticised the CDM, stating that it needed "significant revision".<sup>4</sup> It was suggested by others that a more focussed, victim-centred process was required. Bishop Peter Hancock (then Lead Bishop on Safeguarding) agreed, saying that "the church needs to get on with this … let's look at what we are trying to achieve, find a process that does that".<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Forster 3 July 2019 37/17-25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Welby 11 July 2019 207/13-208/20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Hancock 11 July 2019 139/1-5

### Part D

# Conclusions and recommendations

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#### D.1: Conclusions in respect of the Church of England

**1.** The Church of England failed to protect some children and young people from sexual predators within their midst. In the past, the system of child protection was under-resourced. Safeguarding personnel were at times ignored and their advice overlooked, in favour of protecting the reputation of clergy and the Church. During the Inquiry's hearings, senior leaders in the Church apologised for its actions, recognising that failings identified by this investigation and other reviews were "profoundly and deeply shocking".<sup>852</sup>

**2.** Since the publication of the Archbishop's Visitation to the Diocese of Chichester in 2013 much has improved, in terms of governance, training, audit, personnel, policies and procedures. However, there is still more to be done. Senior leaders have demonstrated a determination to make necessary changes to keep children safe but, to be effective, this determination needs to be translated into action throughout the Church of England. There is a lack of challenge in decision-making; there remain areas of insufficient oversight. Engagement with and support for victims and survivors requires improvement.

#### Engaging with victims and survivors

**3.** The Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) final overview report, published in July 2019 following an extensive programme of audits, found that the Church of England is yet to regain fully the trust of those who have been abused. It has been slow to find ways to engage effectively with victims and survivors or to learn from their experiences.

**4.** The Safe Spaces project, which was first proposed six years ago as an online resource and national helpline for survivors in partnership with the Catholic Church, has taken too long to implement.

#### Safeguarding policies and practices

**5.** Prior to 2013 (and the publication of the report of the Archbishop's Visitation to the Diocese of Chichester), many of the Church of England's safeguarding policies had significant weaknesses and implementation of those policies was patchy.

**6.** The review and redraft of the policies by the National Safeguarding Team since 2015 has been comprehensive. For example, the *Parish Safeguarding Handbook* (launched in 2019) and the e-safeguarding manual help to reinforce and simplify the safeguarding message.<sup>853</sup>

<sup>852</sup> ACE027710

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>853</sup> Parish Safeguarding Handbook

**7.** There are still improvements to be made to the development of policies and practice. The comments made by SCIE<sup>854</sup> and by Mrs Edina Carmi during the course of this investigation, including that the volume of guidance has created some confusion and should be rationalised into one simple and accessible set of procedures, merit consideration by the Church in order to see whether any action should be taken.

#### The structure of safeguarding in the Church of England

**8.** The Church of England has struggled to develop a model for effective safeguarding within its organisational structure. The building blocks of the Church are the dioceses. The Church of England has not resolved the need for safeguarding to function at a diocesan level with the requirement for sufficient accountability to and oversight from the National Safeguarding Team to ensure consistency of decision-making.

**9.** Effective safeguarding is required at parish, diocesan and Church-wide levels. The model suggested by Mr Colin Perkins, the Chichester diocesan safeguarding adviser (DSA), provides a helpful starting point for the Church to consider. In particular, Mr Perkins' suggestion that the DSA should become a diocesan safeguarding officer (DSO). The change in title is significant. It indicates that DSOs should be taking decisions, not only providing advice. It is essential that operational decisions about safeguarding are made by safeguarding professionals.

**10.** DSOs need sufficient authority to take action, without the approval of the diocesan bishop, in respect of key safeguarding tasks, in particular:

- reporting all safeguarding matters to statutory authorities;
- managing or commissioning lessons learned reviews;
- commissioning investigations;
- commissioning and instructing risk assessments during or following safeguarding investigations;
- ensuring that pastoral support is given to complainants in safeguarding investigations (including during police or Clergy Discipline Measure (CDM) investigations);
- reporting safeguarding-related matters to the National Safeguarding Team; and
- reporting serious incidents to the Charity Commission.

**11.** The SCIE recommendation for the introduction of a national arrangement for the appointment, management and supervision of DSAs or DSOs would replace the local ownership of DSAs that currently exists and may help to increase their independence by providing a route, outside of the diocese, through which concerns could be raised.

**12.** The National Safeguarding Team has proposed by the end of 2020 a regional leadership structure with regional safeguarding advisers to provide a point of escalation for disputes and professional supervision for DSAs. They will also monitor and seek to provide consistency between dioceses and to lead work on survivor engagement. Such a proposal may help to provide the level of oversight which was previously lacking.<sup>855</sup>

<sup>854</sup> ACE026753\_043-046

<sup>855</sup> ACE027811

**13.** DSOs – not clergy – are best placed to decide which cases to refer to the police or social services, and what action should be taken by the Church to keep children safe. Diocesan bishops have an important role to play, in particular to help congregations and clergy to understand safeguarding and to make it a priority, *"intrinsic to the beliefs"* of the Church of England, but they should not hold operational responsibility for safeguarding.<sup>856</sup>

**14.** The theological work undertaken by the Faith and Order Commission is valuable in the development of a theology of safeguarding and its spiritual underpinning.

#### The role of the National Safeguarding Team

**15.** As the reports of SCIE demonstrate, there are some continuing weaknesses with aspects of the Church's policies, in particular with the escalation process for raising concerns about how a diocese manages safeguarding.<sup>857</sup> The policies lack clarity about what needs to be referred to whom and when.<sup>858</sup> The National Safeguarding Team does not have the power to intervene in a diocese, even where it appears that safeguarding is being inadequately managed or handled prior to any crisis arising. The only legal power currently available is that of an Archbishop's Visitation. While the CDM can be used against individuals, it does not solve systemic problems with Church organisation. A Visitation is not an appropriate tool to address emerging safeguarding issues at a diocesan level.

**16.** To be effective, the role of the National Director of Safeguarding requires overall responsibility for managing safeguarding within the Church and providing oversight of those operating at a diocesan level. It is the responsibility of the National Safeguarding Team to ensure that safeguarding policies and practices are of a good standard and are properly implemented within dioceses.

#### Funding of safeguarding

**17.** Until 2015 the funding of safeguarding was piecemeal and insufficient. Since then, there has been a significant increase in funding of safeguarding activity at all levels of the Church (parish, diocesan and central) but from a very low base.<sup>859</sup> There is still a disparity between needs and resources across some dioceses.

**18.** Every diocesan safeguarding team requires sufficient resources to fulfil its essential functions, having regard to the size and needs of that diocese.

#### **External monitoring**

**19.** The Church's programme of external audits has provided a valuable source of independent scrutiny of its safeguarding policies and procedures, as well as its practice on the ground. The Church would also benefit from a suitable programme of regular internal progress reviews.

**20.** When independent reviews of individual cases are commissioned about the most serious safeguarding cases, the process for their commissioning could benefit from liaison with the victim or survivor as well as other relevant parties.

<sup>856</sup> ACE026753\_022

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>857</sup> ACE026753; ACE025256; ACE025220

<sup>858</sup> ACE026753\_048

#### Cathedrals

**21.** Although cathedrals are situated within dioceses, they are independent and are separately governed by the cathedral chapter. The diocesan bishop has no executive role and is not involved on a day-to-day basis in the administration of a cathedral's affairs.

**22.** The Chichester/Peter Ball Investigation Report dealt with safeguarding concerns which had arisen in respect of cathedrals.<sup>860</sup> Since the publication of that report, SCIE has commenced a series of audits of the safeguarding arrangements in cathedrals. The preliminary results of those audits indicate continuing problems with the safeguarding governance of the cathedrals audited so far.

**23.** The Church of England's own cathedrals working group identified that, in comparison to dioceses, cathedrals still had much more to do in respect of safeguarding.<sup>861</sup> The concerns set out in that working group report have led the Church to promote a new Cathedrals Measure<sup>862</sup> which will amend the governance structure of cathedrals and set out the relationship between a cathedral and a diocese. Cathedrals will become charitable organisations regulated by the Charity Commission, which will be the first time that cathedrals become externally accountable.<sup>863</sup>

**24.** The guidance and the cathedrals working group have now made clear that the dean of a cathedral is accountable to the diocesan bishop on safeguarding matters,<sup>864</sup> and that the diocesan bishop must ensure that there are clear safeguarding arrangements in place. These changes resolve a number of the concerns which we have previously expressed but it remains important that the cathedral safeguarding arrangements are compatible with those of the diocese. It is likely, given the emerging findings from the SCIE cathedrals audits, that cathedrals will require considerably greater resourcing.

**25.** Where a cathedral has links with choir schools, clarity is required between each cathedral and school to ensure that there are commonly understood policies. There should be no ambiguity about where responsibility for responding to safeguarding concerns lies.

#### **Civil claims**

**26.** Sensitivity and tact are required throughout the management of civil claims relating to child sexual abuse. Those managing claims need to demonstrate an understanding of the psychological effects of child sexual abuse and the potential for additional distress to be caused by the litigation process.

**27.** Over time, the Ecclesiastical Insurance Office (EIO) has developed its understanding of handling civil claims about child sexual abuse. It has acknowledged that it has improved its practices and procedures in the light of what it calls "*sometimes bitter experience*".<sup>865</sup> The EIO's Guiding Principles for managing claims of child sexual abuse are constructive. The Guiding Principles should also be used by the Church as a starting point in assessing uninsured cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>860</sup> Anglican Church Case Studies: Chichester/Peter Ball Investigation Report B.2 and Part D

<sup>861</sup> ACE026362

<sup>862</sup> ACE027746

<sup>863</sup> ACE027555\_013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>864</sup> ACE026157\_031-032; ACE025247\_010\_021

<sup>865</sup> EIO000154

**28.** However, the Guiding Principles are only effective if they are followed and if they are reflected in the advice provided to the Church of England. The case of AN-A4 showed the Church of England being provided with unclear advice, the result of which was that pastoral support was withdrawn from a highly vulnerable individual at a time of need. This is not acceptable. It is disappointing that the EIO was unable to recognise or accept its failings in that case upon the publication of the Elliott review. This was compounded by its failure to provide evidence to this Inquiry in a candid manner, requiring us to recall a witness to explain why the information previously given to us was incomplete.<sup>866</sup>

**29.** While the Church is not directly responsible for the management of an insured claim, in which its insurer acts on its behalf, the Church retains responsibility for providing pastoral support to complainants, victims and survivors.<sup>867</sup> What many victims and survivors want is a genuine and meaningful apology. The EIO has made plain that it does not apologise on the Church's behalf and does not prevent the Church from doing so. It is a matter for the Church as to how such apologies should be made and who would be the appropriate person to do this.

#### Recruitment, training and professional development

#### Recruitment and training of clergy

**30.** As set out in the Chichester/Peter Ball Investigation Report, there are examples of clergy being ordained despite a history of child sexual offences and examples of clergy who were unable or unwilling to properly fulfil their safeguarding responsibilities.

**31.** Whilst the Church has reviewed and developed its approach to recruiting and training clergy, it accepts that even now the criteria against which candidates' suitability for ordination are judged do not specifically include safeguarding. The Church says that it is addressing this through the ongoing work of the Future Clergy Review.

**32.** Attitudes to safeguarding ought to be an important element of the selection and training of clergy.

**33.** Psychological assessment of candidates is a valuable mechanism for use in the selection of clergy for ordination. Nevertheless, the Church has yet to make a decision about how it is going to make use of psychological assessment within its recruitment process, and how it will ensure that this is used consistently.

#### Disclosure and Barring Service checks

**34.** In all three hearings for this investigation we heard concerns, including from DSAs and the national safeguarding adviser, about the difficulty in identifying who is eligible for an enhanced criminal record (Disclosure and Barring Service or DBS) check. This arises because the current definition of 'regulated activity' within the statutory guidance is unclear and narrow. It focuses exclusively on the time spent with an individual, rather than the nature of the relationship that individual may have with a child.

**35.** The definition does not transfer easily to a religious organisation like the Church of England or the Church in Wales.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>866</sup> Bonehill and Titchener 12 July 2019\_001-030

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>867</sup> EIO000147\_001

**36.** A DBS check is one part of the process of safer recruitment. It is a valuable tool, particularly to identify those who may not have been convicted of offences but whose behaviour may have placed them on the barred list for children or vulnerable adults.

#### Ministerial development for ordained clergy

**37.** The current bi-annual reviews of clergy ministerial development do not assess or monitor the performance or understanding of their safeguarding functions. Considering safeguarding in these reviews would be a logical continuation of its inclusion in the consideration of a candidate's suitability for ordination.

**38.** The current capability procedures do not effectively deal with performance concerns about safeguarding. The responsibilities of members of clergy can be difficult to fulfil. As can be seen from some of the sampling cases, they have to make difficult decisions or investigate with only limited assistance. Ordained clergy lack a system of assistance, support and performance management.

#### **Clergy Discipline Measure**

**39.** The Clergy Discipline Measure (CDM) is a complex process that takes too long to reach a conclusion in relation to safeguarding matters.

**40.** A 12-month limit for bringing a complaint continues to apply to allegations that a member of clergy has failed to have "*due regard*" to safeguarding policies in their response to a disclosure of abuse or management of a safeguarding matter. This is not appropriate. Victims and survivors often find it difficult to report abuse until some time after the event. As a result, safeguarding failures are equally likely to come to light outside of the 12-month limit.

**41.** In addition, we have seen from our sampling exercise that some bishops are still reluctant to start proceedings against those who have failed in their safeguarding duties. It is possible that the proposals endorsed above for enhancing the powers of the DSO and the National Safeguarding Team may, in part, address such concerns.

**42.** The CDM needs to be reviewed in respect of how it manages allegations of child sexual abuse by clergy and how it treats complaints about a failure to have "*due regard*" to safeguarding guidance in responding to allegations of abuse. The most significant flaws are:

- The initial investigation of complaints which concern safeguarding that would merit 'rebuke' (a warning) or more serious disciplinary action is not independent of the diocese.
- There are no alternative processes, similar to capability reviews, through which concerns that someone is struggling to manage safeguarding issues effectively could be dealt with outside of the CDM.
- There is no suitable pastoral support, guidance and counselling available for victims and survivors if they have to engage in the CDM process as complainants or witnesses.
- Case management does not effectively ensure that CDM cases, particularly those involving safeguarding, are dealt with expeditiously.
- Individuals carrying out fact-finding investigations, which involve taking evidence from complainants, victims and survivors, do not have specialist training in interviewing complainants.

**43.** The penalty of deposition from holy orders (through which clergy are stripped of their clerical title) retains symbolic importance, particularly to victims and survivors. It is not available in the Church of England for those convicted of or disciplined for child sexual abuse.

#### Seal of the confessional

**44.** The Archbishop of Canterbury and Archbishop of York both advocated a Church of England internal policy of mandatory reporting. We heard powerful evidence from an eminent canon lawyer, who is also a survivor of sexual abuse, and from others, that the seal of the confessional should be removed in cases of child sexual offending. Whilst there has been considerable discussion of this topic within the Church of England, it cannot agree internally. This was well-illustrated by the failure of the seal of the confessional working party to make any conclusions or recommendations on its subject matter.

**45.** This issue is one of significance in other Inquiry investigations. We will consider the evidence and return to it in the Inquiry's final report.

#### D.2: Conclusions in respect of the Church in Wales

**46.** The Church in Wales has a centralised safeguarding structure with provincial safeguarding officers responsible for safeguarding in dioceses throughout the Church in Wales. The provincial safeguarding officers are spread too thinly. There are not enough provincial safeguarding officers to meet the demands of the role. Greater resources, both in funding and personnel, are required.

**47.** The Church in Wales recognises that its policies and procedures require review and reform in the light of changing circumstances.

**48.** There were examples of good practice in individual cases. Reverend Christopher Watkins dealt very effectively with a safeguarding case by responding quickly, taking decisive action and putting the welfare of the child at the heart of his decision-making (see Annex 3).

**49.** The Church in Wales has not, to date, had a programme of external auditing. As a result, it has not benefited from independent scrutiny of its safeguarding policies and procedures.

**50.** A significant problem for the Church in Wales is record-keeping. The sampling exercise demonstrated both poor record-keeping and an absence of records. This is consistent with other internal reviews of the Church in Wales. There should be clear policies in place on record-keeping. In addition, safeguarding staff need to have access to the relevant personnel files.

**51.** The Church in Wales has struggled to identify what action it should take where statutory authorities determine that no action is required by the police or local authority. In such cases, the Church in Wales requires a clear process for carrying out an investigation and fact-finding to determine whether disciplinary action is required and to inform a risk assessment.

**52.** There has been no clarity or consistency in how agreements enabling offenders to worship in the Church in Wales are organised and managed. The Church in Wales is producing written procedural guidelines concerning the establishment, monitoring and review of offender management safeguarding agreements.

**53.** The system of discipline in the Church in Wales has some strengths. In particular, the Church in Wales has an independent safeguarding body which reviews all complaints and decisions about whether complaints go to the Clergy Discipline Tribunal. This body is not tied to a diocese. Having a disciplinary tribunal process which is wholly separate to the dioceses has provided a measure of independence and impartiality. However, currently the Church cannot discipline clergy or other church officers if they fail to follow professional advice from provincial safeguarding officers or recommendations from the safeguarding panel.

**54.** It should be for provincial safeguarding officers and not for clergy to decide which cases should be referred to the police or social services, and what action should be taken to keep children safe.

**55.** The Archbishop of Wales admitted that there is no effective monitoring of the ministry of Church in Wales chaplains operating in external organisations, even though they are licensed by the Church.

**56.** The Church in Wales is clear that persons convicted of child sexual offences cannot hold trustee positions but does not have a clear stated policy in relation to appointing other members of its Governing Body.

**57.** There has been very little systematic provision by the Church in Wales for victims and survivors of child sexual abuse. There has been no systematic access to counselling, therapy and other forms of help.

**58.** Information-sharing about matters relevant to safeguarding between the Church of England and the Church in Wales is piecemeal and lacking any formality. The Church in Wales and the statutory authorities have no formal information-sharing protocol with the police forces and social services departments in Wales.

#### D.3: Matters to be explored further by the Inquiry

**59.** The Inquiry will return to a number of issues which emerged during this investigation. These include:

- the seal of the confessional;
- mandatory reporting; and
- the disclosure and barring regime, and how it applies to volunteers and to religious organisations.

We anticipate these issues will be addressed in our final report.

#### **D.4: Recommendations**

The Chair and Panel make the following recommendations, which arise directly from this investigation.

The institutions named below should publish their response to these recommendations, including the timetable involved, within six months of the publication of this report.

#### **Recommendations relating to the Church of England**

#### Recommendation 1: The structure of safeguarding in the Church of England

The Church of England should create the role of a diocesan safeguarding officer to replace the diocesan safeguarding adviser. Diocesan safeguarding officers should have the authority to make decisions independently of the diocesan bishop in respect of key safeguarding tasks, including:

- i) escalating incidents to the National Safeguarding Team, statutory authorities and the Charity Commission;
- ii) advising on the suspension of clergy in safeguarding matters;
- iii) investigating and/or commissioning investigations into safeguarding incidents;
- iv) risk assessments and associated plans for church officers and members of the congregation; and
- v) supporting complainants in safeguarding-related issues.

Diocesan safeguarding officers should be employed locally, by the Diocese Board of Finance. The diocesan safeguarding officer's work should be professionally supervised and quality assured by the National Safeguarding Team. The National Safeguarding Team should set the broad requirements for anyone applying to be a diocesan safeguarding officer (adapting as required the existing requirements in respect of diocesan safeguarding advisers).

It should be enshrined in policy that those who are volunteers and who do not follow the directions of diocesan safeguarding officers should be removed from responsibility of working with children.

#### Recommendation 2: Revising clergy discipline

The Church of England should make changes and improvements to the way in which it responds to safeguarding complaints (whether related to allegations of abuse, or a failure to comply with or respond to the Church's safeguarding policies and procedures) to:

- disapply the 12-month time-limit for all complaints with a safeguarding element brought under the Clergy Discipline Measure;
- reintroduce the power to depose from holy orders where a member of the clergy is found guilty of child sexual abuse offences;
- introduce a mandatory 'code of practice' to improve the way that safeguarding issues are handled across the Clergy Discipline Measure and capability procedures, including a framework for responding to issues that do not amount to misconduct;
- make clear that penalty by consent must never be used in relation to such complaints;

- ensure confidentiality agreements are not put in place in relation to such complaints; and
- ensure that those handling such complaints are adequately and regularly trained.

#### **Recommendations relating to the Church in Wales**

#### Recommendation 3: The structure of safeguarding in the Church in Wales

The Church of Wales should make clear that the operational advice of provincial safeguarding officers must be followed by all members of the clergy and other Church officers.

It should be enshrined in policy that those who are volunteers and who do not follow the directions of provincial safeguarding officers should be removed from working with children.

#### Recommendation 4: Record-keeping in the Church in Wales

The Church in Wales should introduce record-keeping policies relating to safeguarding, complaints and whistleblowing. These should be implemented consistently across dioceses. The Church should develop policies and training on the information that must be recorded in files.

The Church should provide its provincial safeguarding officers with the right to see personnel files of clergy, office holders, employees or others if concerns and complaints are raised about child protection or safeguarding.

#### **Recommendations relating to both Churches**

### Recommendation 5: Information-sharing between the Church of England and the Church in Wales

The Church of England and the Church in Wales should agree and implement a formal information-sharing protocol. This should include the sharing of information about clergy who move between the two Churches.

### Recommendation 6: Information-sharing between the Church of England, Church in Wales and statutory partners

The Church of England, the Church in Wales and statutory partners should ensure that information-sharing protocols are in place at a local level between dioceses and statutory partners.

#### Recommendation 7: Support for victims and survivors

The Church of England and the Church in Wales should each introduce a Church-wide policy on the funding and provision of support to victims and survivors of child sexual abuse concerning clergy, Church officers or those with some connection to the Church. The policy should clearly set out the circumstances in which different types of support, including counselling, should be offered. It should make clear that support should always be offered as quickly as possible, taking into account the needs of the victim over time.

The policy should take account of the views of victims and survivors. It should be mandatory for the policy to be implemented across all dioceses.

#### **Recommendation 8: Auditing**

The Church in Wales should introduce independent external auditing of its safeguarding policies and procedures, as well as the effectiveness of safeguarding practice in dioceses, cathedrals and other Church organisations. Audits should be conducted regularly and reports should be published.

The Church of England should continue independent external auditing of its safeguarding policies and procedures, as well as the effectiveness of safeguarding practice in dioceses, cathedrals and other Church organisations. Audits should continue to be conducted regularly and reports should continue to be published.